High containment laboratories conducting research on dangerous pathogens occupy a contested space in biosecurity policy, as they are critical for biodefense but also a potential source of catastrophic risk. This project will examine the historical evolution of high containment research, analyze tradeoffs between research value and biosecurity/biosafety risks, and assess current oversight mechanisms.
About the project
Short project description High containment laboratories conducting research on dangerous pathogens occupy a contested space in biosecurity policy, serving as critical infrastructure for biodefense but also as a potential source of catastrophic risk. Fort Detrick exemplifies this tension: once home to the US offensive biological weapons program, it transitioned after 1969 to purely defensive research. Recent congressional scrutiny has raised pointed questions about the legitimacy of certain research with dangerous pathogens. This project will examine the historical evolution of high containment research at Fort Detrick, analyze the tradeoffs between research value and biosecurity/biosafety risks, and assess current oversight mechanisms.
Methods
- Literature review
- Interviews with (former) researchers at high-containment labs, biosecurity policy experts, and congressional staff
- Analysis of oversight frameworks (FFRDC arrangements, congressional reporting, arms control compliance assessments)
Key Research Questions A) Historical Context and Institutional Legacy
- How did Fort Detrick's transition from offensive to defensive biological research reshape its institutional culture, research priorities, and relationship with oversight bodies?
- What lessons from the 1969 decision to end the offensive program remain relevant to contemporary debates about permissible defensive research? -How has the "dual-use" framing evolved over time, and how do researchers and policymakers navigate ambiguous cases where the distinction between legitimate defensive research and potentially problematic work is unclear? B) Risk-Benefit Tradeoffs
- What categories of research conducted at high containment facilities like NBACC provide clear defensive or public health value, and which remain more contested?
- How should policymakers weigh the risks of laboratory accidents or misuse against the costs of foregoing certain research capabilities?
- What role do "Work for Others" arrangements and inter-agency collaborations play in diffusing accountability and complicating risk assessment? C) Oversight and Governance
- How effective are current oversight mechanisms—including DHS internal reviews, Biological Weapons Convention compliance assessments, and congressional appropriations—at ensuring research stays within appropriate bounds?
- What gaps exist in the current framework, and how might proposals like the Risky Research Review Act address or fail to address them?
- How do biosafety governance and biosecurity governance intersect at facilities like Fort Detrick, and what institutional arrangements best manage both?
Expected Output The primary output will be a policy report or journal article documenting the historical evolution of high containment research at Fort Detrick, analyzing the risk-benefit tradeoffs of current research activities, and offering recommendations for strengthening oversight while preserving legitimate defensive capabilities.
Theory of change
As AI tools lower barriers to designing dangerous biological agents, oversight frameworks for high-risk pathogen research become increasingly important. This project examines how existing governance structures for high containment laboratories—including risk-benefit assessments and oversight mechanisms—have managed dual-use concerns, offering lessons for governing AI-enabled biological research and ensuring that defensive research capabilities don't inadvertently provide blueprints for AI-assisted misuse.
Your role
The mentee should be comfortable working independently. I'll provide clear guidance and will be available for regular check-ins.
Prerequisites
- Experience with literature research
- Familiarity with biosecurity, dual-use research governance, policy research, or federal laboratory oversightis helpful but not essential
Time commitment
at least 5 hours
Application question(s)
Please explain in under 200 words why you're interested in this project and how your background and skills will help make this project a success.
About the mentor
Anemone Franz is a visiting research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where she focuses on biosafety and biosecurity. Before joining AEI, Dr. Franz worked as a clinical trial physician at the biotech startup Alvea and as an adviser for the nonprofit 80,000 Hours. She was a 2024 fellow in the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity program at Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and a 2025 International Mid-Career Biosecurity Fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks. She is also a member of the European Leadership Network. Her work has appeared in publications such as the Hill, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Dr. Franz holds a master’s in public health policy from Harvard University and a doctorate in medicine from Julius-Maximilians University of Würzburg.